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ARGUMENT 
I. 
SCHWARTZ IS ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE 
JURY'S VERDICT 
A. Schwartz7s Appeal of The Jury Verdict is Appropriate. 
The completed jury verdict form was completely 
incomprehensible. In its brief, Benzow admits that the jury 
verdict form was so obviously inconsistent that the plaintiff's 
counsel should have objected immediately upon it being read aloud. 
(Appellee's Brief at 9-10). However obvious the verdict sheet was 
on its face, Schwartz's counsel did not have an opportunity to 
review the completed jury verdict form prior to the jury being 
dismissed. The jury was dismissed within seconds of the verdict 
being read. T. 375-376. 
In addition, Benzow attempts to divert the Court's attention 
away from the obviously defective jury verdict. On the one hand, 
Benzow asserts that the jury's verdict was quite clear. But to do 
so, Benzow admittedly overlooks the jury's answers to questions 
number 2 and 4, which determined both parties proximately caused 
the accident. On the other hand, Benzow admits that the answers to 
these two questions "may be a bit unusual." Therefore, according 
to Benzow's position, the jury verdict form can only be understood 
if the answers to questions 2 and 4 are ignored. This approach is 
totally inappropriate. The entire jury verdict sheet must be read 
together, and it is clearly illogical. 
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B. The Jury Verdict Is Totally Inconsistent. 
According to the second argument set forth by Benzow, the 
completed jury verdict sheet should be read backwards and by 
reading it that way, the jury verdict should be affirmed. 
(Appellee's Brief at 12-13). Benzow asks this Court to only 
examine the jury's response to question number 5 while reading it 
with the jury's negative response to question number 1. First, 
common sense and logic dictates that the jury sheet must be read in 
order. Renumbering questions after the jury has already rendered 
its verdict is completely inappropriate. Second, regardless of how 
one reads question number 5 and its answer of 50/50 allocation of 
fault, it cannot be reconciled with both of the jury's "no" answers 
with respect to each party's negligence. (Questions 1 and 3, 
respectively). 
Furthermore, Benzow asks the Court to view the answers to 
questions 2, 3, and 4 as "surplusage, which do not affect the 
dispositive findings." (Appellee's Brief at 13). Based upon this 
approach, Benzow again argues the jury's intent was clear. Despite 
this contention, Benzow fails to explain how the jury could 
determine neither party was negligent, yet find both parties 
proximately caused the accident. Again, the completed jury verdict 
form must be read in whole, which clearly establishes a totally 
inconsistent finding. 
II. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE WITNESS' HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Benzow sets forth factual information regarding Officer 
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Bigler's qualifications in an effort to establish the Officer's 
credibility as a witness. This background information is 
irrelevant to the fact that the statements of Erica Wolfe and 
Carolyn constitute hearsay and should have been deemed 
inadmissible. 
Benzow masks the main issue, which is the trial Court's error 
in allowing Bigler to testify regarding the hearsay statements. 
Benzow's argument on this issue misses the point. Benzow's 
argument is that the pubic records exception under Utah R. Evid. 
803(8) somehow permits Officer Bigeler to testify to hearsay 
statements. The public records exception is not relevant to our 
case. The issue is not the admissibility of a record, but rather 
the admissibility of testimony from a witness. Pointedly, the 
police report which Benzow focuses on, was not even introduced as 
evidence at the trial. 
Benzow refers to a second hearsay exception, Rule 803 (1) . 
This exception does not apply to the statements made by Erica Wolfe 
and Carolyn. Rule 803(1) permits statements "made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter." Here, the statements were made well after the 
accident. Benzow incorrectly implies that Erica Wolfe's statements 
were given to Officer Bigler while she was laying on the road. 
(Appellee's Brief at 14-15 and T.251). Officer Bigler testified he 
also interviewed Ms. Wolfe at the hospital. T. 251. The record is 
silent as to when Ms. Wolfe made the statement to the police 
officer. Regardless of whether the statement was made at the 
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location of the accident or at the hospital, it was too remote in 
time to qualify under the Rule 803(1) hearsay exception. 
The same would apply to the statement made by Carolyn, as she 
clearly spoke to Officer Bigler at the hospital. T. 253. 
Additionally, given the injuries sustained by both Erica and 
Carolyn, their statements to Officer Bigler are unreliable and 
should not have been admitted on that basis alone. 
The admission of the hearsay statements into evidence through 
Officer Bigler7s testimony was clearly prejudicial error and 
demands a reversal. 
III. 
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
INSTRUCTED REGARDING NO PASSING ZONES 
Proposed jury instruction number 22, with respect to no 
passing zones, was presented to the Court in a timely fashion. The 
Court considered the jury instruction on its merits. Ultimately, 
the Court rejected this proposed jury instruction due to the fact 
that it would have required additional jury instructions and the 
Court found it duplicative of other instructions. T. 311-313. 
Benzow argues that since several other jury instructions used 
at trial contain the duties of a motor vehicle operator no error 
was committed. However, none of these instructions contained any 
reference to motor vehicle statutes. In fact, jury instruction 19 
indicates that "every driver is required to . . . pass others only 
after observing that it could be done safely." This instruction 
runs completely counter to the proposed jury instruction number 22, 
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which does not permit passing on a double yellow line. Therefore, 
the Court's failure to provide instruction number 22 prejudiced 
Schwartz and requires a reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Schwartz is entitled to a new 
trial. 
NAGEL RICE & DREIFUSS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Andrew R. Bronsnick 
Dated: November 16, 1999 
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